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SET THE STATUTES STRAIGHT: AMENDING
THE LANHAM ACT TO DISPEL THE CONFUSION
REGARDING REVERSE CONFUSION
INNA KAMINER*
The typical case of alleged trademark infringement, i.e., “forward
confusion,” involves a larger and more established “senior user” and a
smaller and less powerful “junior user.” The secondary junior user
wrongfully uses the first senior user’s mark as its own, and thus benefits
from the senior user’s more established goodwill. In ruling on a senior
user’s trademark infringement claim, the court will use a set of “likelihood
of confusion” factors to determine if consumers are confusing the junior
user’s goods for that of the senior. Each circuit’s factors vary, but they are
harmonious. The issue that this Note explores is the difficult and
counterintuitive doctrine of reverse confusion.
Reverse confusion occurs when the junior user of a mark is larger and
more powerful than the senior user. As the stronger secondary entity, the
junior user is able to flood the market with advertisements about its good or
service, and consumers purchase the senior user’s product upon the
mistaken belief that it is that of the junior user.
At first, courts did not see the harm in reverse confusion. The less
reputable senior user reaps a profit after all—what is the problem? The
problem is that the senior user has spent time and money in branding its
goods or services with a mark that the senior user wants to indicate as its
source. When a powerful junior user adopts that mark, consumers believe
that the mark indicates the junior user as the source of the goods, rather
than the true smaller entity. This confusion harms the senior user’s
goodwill and reputation.
Although all federal courts now recognize the doctrine of reverse
confusion and the harm it imposes, this Note describes how far the courts
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have come and how far they still have yet to go. There is no coherent test,
and the likelihood of confusion analysis in forward confusion does not
outright apply in reverse confusion cases due to the inverse power
relationship between the parties. Because the senior user is the weaker
entity in a reverse confusion case, certain likelihood of confusion factors
should be analyzed differently to take this into account. For example, in a
typical forward confusion case the court considers the inherent and
commercial strength of the senior user’s mark. The stronger the mark, the
greater the likelihood of confusion. If this analysis were to directly apply
in reverse confusion, where the junior user is by definition the stronger
entity, every senior user would lose on the strength of the mark factor.
Therefore, the analysis in reverse confusion should be changed to consider
the strength of the junior user’s mark and its relative likelihood of
confusion. Discreet, but consequential, modifications such as this will
correct the likelihood of confusion analysis to ensure a consistent and just
result in reverse confusion cases. Furthermore, this Note posits that
legislative action is needed to statutorily define a uniform test.
Part I of this Note introduces the problematic realm of reverse
confusion faced by the courts. Part II begins with the public policies
underlying trademark law and explains a viable trademark infringement
claim under the Lanham Act. Part III addresses consumer confusion in
both the traditional forward confusion cases and reverse confusion cases.
Additionally, Part III also discusses the inherent confusion and lack of
clarity caused by inconsistent circuit court approaches. Part IV argues why
reverse confusion is an important, separate, actionable claim. Lastly, Part
V concludes that legislative action is needed to dispel the confusion
regarding reverse confusion in the courts and sets forth the principles to
adopt in amending the Lanham Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: you open a business, create a great product, find a
catchy name, register it as a trademark, and enjoy considerable success as a
result. Your product hits the marketplace and receives recognition; this
product, called “Guys & Dolls,” is your livelihood! One day, a new entity
uses the name “Guys & Dolls” on its product. This new entity of “Guys &
Dolls” (the “Junior User”) is larger and financially greater than your small,
but reputable company. The Junior User floods the market with
advertisements for its new product. Next thing you know, its product is
flying off the shelves and consumers are coming to you for the Junior
User’s product. Naturally, you inform the consumers that you do not carry
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the Junior User’s “Guys & Dolls.” Rather, your “Guys & Dolls” is a
completely different product. Because you do not carry the Junior User’s
product, consumers feel cheated and leave you nasty reviews. But whom
did you cheat?
Legally, you did nothing wrong. You created a product, found a
creative name, received trademark registration, and used it for years before
this Junior User ever entered the market with the same name. Still, your
business, your name, and your very livelihood are now at stake. So, you
decide to file suit for trademark infringement. The court, however,
concludes that your claim is not viable because unlike a typical trademark
infringement case, you are dealing with a case of reverse confusion.
Unlike a typical forward confusion claim, where the senior user is the
stronger entity, a reverse confusion claim involves a stronger junior entity.1
Why should your business suffer simply because it is the weaker entity?
This Note will address this very issue.
The Lanham Act (“the Act”) governs federal trademark protection.2
Creating two statutory bases for any confusion-based claim, the Act
provides for nationwide protection of a trademark against threats, such as
the unauthorized reproduction or imitation of a trademark that is “likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”3 A trademark
protectable under the Lanham Act is:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona
fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the
principal register established by this Act, to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source

1. Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion”
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
175, 175 (2004).
2. Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).
3. Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 422 & n.6 (2014) (explaining
that section 32(1)(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1114] of the Lanham Act provides for remedies for
infringement of registered trademarks, while section 43(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1125] of the Act is a
parallel cause of action applying to unregistered rights); see 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (section 32
of the Lanham Act); Id. § 1125 (section 43 of the Lanham Act).
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of the goods, even if that source is unknown.4
In order to recover damages or injunctive relief in a trademark
infringement case, the court generally looks at (1) the inherent strength of
the mark and (2) the likelihood of consumer confusion.5 In a typical
likelihood of confusion case, known as “forward confusion,” the first or
senior user alleges that a secondary or junior user is using the senior user’s
mark, thus trading off the typically larger and more established senior
user’s public goodwill.6 Take, for example, a Louis Vuitton knock-off
emblazoned with “LV”: such a purse sold by a junior user will lead
consumers to believe the product actually comes from the senior user,
Louis Vuitton, because it bears the “LV” symbol. In reverse confusion,
however, the senior user is the smaller and less powerful entity, alleging
that the large and powerful junior user has confused the public as to the
source of the product.7 Misperceiving the source of a product harms the
senior trademark holder’s goodwill by diminishing the value of its mark.8
Consider the following example:
The plaintiff (senior user) makes widgets for a niche market
segment under Brand B. Most widget-buyers have never heard
of the plaintiff or of Brand B. The defendant (junior user) is a
major, national widget manufacturer, well-known to the entire
widget-buying population. The defendant launches a national
advertising campaign introducing its new waterproof widget,
which it calls the B Widget. Everyone is suddenly aware of B
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also David D. Mouery, Comment, Trademark Law and
the Bottom Line – Coke Is It!, 2 BARRY L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
5. See 111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 10 (2009); see also Mott, supra note 3,
at 435 (“The Act requires proving two factors before liability may attach: first, the mark must
merit protection and second, the defendant’s use of the same or similar mark has caused a
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.”).
6. Del Pizzo, supra note 1, at 175.
7. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271 (2003) (discussing the differences between forward and
reverse confusion and how the issue is fundamentally the same in both: whether a consumer
would be confused as to the source of the products).
8. Id. at 287.
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Widgets. New potential customers who come across the
plaintiff’s Brand B widgets think that the plaintiff is mimicking
the defendant.9
Until 1977, no court had held reverse confusion to be actionable.10
Even thereafter, when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged
the doctrine of reverse confusion in 1994, its own district courts had
refused to recognize such claims.11 While circuit courts now recognize
reverse confusion claims, the factors that apply vary from circuit to circuit,
giving rise to inconsistencies.12 Absent a definitive verdict by the Supreme
Court establishing a succinct test, confusion regarding reverse confusion
continues to grow.13 This Note argues that, given the level of incertitude, a
judicially created test is not enough. Uniformity and clarification require
legislative action to (1) make clear that reverse confusion is a separate,
actionable claim under the Lanham Act and (2) set forth the elements
required to prove a reverse confusion claim.
Part II of this Note begins with the public policies underlying
trademark law and explains a viable trademark infringement claim under
the Lanham Act. Part III addresses consumer confusion in both the
traditional forward confusion cases and reverse confusion cases.
Additionally, Part III also discusses the inherent confusion and lack of
9. POLLACK, supra note 5, § 7.
10. See Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 737, 747 (2004) (“The first court case to recognize reverse confusion as an actionable theory
was Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in 1977.”); see also Big O Tire
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977); Buckman,
supra note 7, at 288 (noting that the concept of reverse confusion, though not the designation,
was recognized in 1918).
11. Del Pizzo, supra note 1, at 188 (“Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set
forth these three promising exceptions for ‘reverse confusion’ cases, it is most disturbing that
district courts within the circuit hearing ‘reverse confusion’ cases after the Circuit’s lead case
disregarded Circuit precedent.”).
12. See id. at 186–202 (discussing several circuit courts’ analyses and the different factors
that each circuit uses in analyzing a reverse confusion case, thus causing confusion due to the lack
of a uniform test); see also Scholer, supra note 10, at 739 (“In direct and reverse confusion cases,
courts use varied multifactor tests to determine whether a ‘likelihood of confusion’ exists between
the senior and junior users’ marks.”).
13. See Scholer, supra note 10, at 748 (“Although courts have grown more comfortable
with the reverse confusion cause of action, not one has articulated an appropriate standard for
fashioning a complete remedy under the Lanham Act.”).
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clarity caused by inconsistent circuit court approaches. Part IV argues why
reverse confusion is an important, separate, actionable claim. Lastly, Part
V concludes that legislative action is needed to dispel the confusion
regarding reverse confusion in the courts and sets forth the principles to
adopt in amending the Lanham Act.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND
A. The Purposes of Trademark Protection
Trademark protection serves two primary purposes.14
First,
trademarks prevent the use of identical or similar marks in the marketplace,
which may confuse the consuming public as to the actual source of the
goods.15 Second, trademarks “protect the goodwill that companies have
built up in their trademarks.”16 “Congress recognized two groups who need
trademark protection, consumers and trademark owners. Trademark
protection assures that consumers receive an item from the intended
originator, and that trademark owners retain the value of the resources they
commit to building their mark and associated goodwill without others
misappropriating their mark.”17 As a result, the public is protected from
gimmicks “passed off” as the source of another’s work product, and
manufacturers are protected from unauthentic attempts to use their name to
indicate false source.18 Based on these public policies behind trademark
protection, then, logic reasons that even if the senior user is the weaker
user, its goodwill should still be protected against a stronger junior user.
B. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, “codifies the law of trademarks
[and] protects the consuming public from confusion about the source of
14. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 286 (2003).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
737, 742 (2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1274).
18. See id. at 742; see also Buckman, supra note 14, at 288.
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products and services.”19 “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act20 prohibits,
among other things, the use of any false designation of origin in connection
with goods or services which is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of
a person’s goods or services.”21 In order to have an infringement claim
under the Lanham Act, there must be a protectable mark and a likelihood of
consumer confusion.22
Plaintiffs in trademark infringement cases must first prove they have
rights to the mark to show that the mark is protectable.23 To do so, the
plaintiff must either produce a registration for the mark at issue on the
principle register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”)24 or, for unregistered marks, prove common law rights.25
Common law rights are established by showing that the mark has been used
in commerce and proving that the mark is either “inherently distinctive” or
has otherwise acquired “secondary meaning.”26 Generally, marks are
characterized using the Abercrombie scale, in order of ascending
protectability: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) fanciful,

19. Buckman, supra note 14, at 271.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
21. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of Doctrine of “Reverse Passing Off”
Under Lanham Act, 194 A.L.R. FED. 175, 175 (2004) (“One type of conduct may constitute a
false designation of origin—‘reverse passing off’ or ‘reverse palming off’—which occurs when a
producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his or her goods or services.”).
22. 111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 10 (2009); see also Christina P. Mott,
Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of Confusion” Factors for ReverseConfusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More Consistent and Predictable Results,
47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 435 (2014) (“The Act requires proving two factors before liability
may attach: first, the mark must merit protection and second, the defendant’s use of the same or
similar mark has caused a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.”).
23. See POLLACK, supra note 22.
24. See Eric G. Shupin, Trademark Law Finally Showing its Age in the Federal Circuit:
Senior Versus Junior Users in the Battle of Reverse Confusion, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 87, 92 (2013)
(illustrating that, although registering a trademark with the USPTO is not required, the benefits of
doing so include “public notice of ownership of the mark; the ‘exclusive right to use the mark
nationwide on or in connection with the goods [and] services’ associated with the trademark;
[and] the ‘ability to bring an action concerning the mark in federal court . . . .’”).
25. POLLACK, supra note 22, § 11.
26. Id.
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and/or arbitrary.27 Generic words have no protection as a mark.28 If a word
is deemed descriptive in this context, then it is not inherently distinctive,
but may still be protectable if it acquires a secondary meaning over time. 29
“Secondary meaning” is an automatic association in the consumer’s mind
between a mark and the source of the good or product it represents.30
Secondary meaning is usually gained over time at the cost of the
manufacturer’s marketing and advertising expenses to ensure that
consumers associate this manufacturer with this particular product.31
Fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks are afforded the highest
protection.32 Once a plaintiff proves the rights to the mark, the next step is
proving a likelihood of consumer confusion.33

27. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
(creating the four classes of trademarks); accord. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 768 (1992) (upholding the Abercrombie classification, but splitting the last “arbitrary or
fanciful” category into categories four and five, “arbitrary” and “fanciful”); see also Mott, supra
note 22, at 436–37 (explaining that the Abercrombie court first established the four-category
classification system, which the Two Pesos court later upheld but split into five categories).
28. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 12:1 (4th ed. 2015).
29. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060–61 (7th Cir.
1995) (explaining that a descriptive term can become a protectable trademark if it has become
distinctive; this acquisition of distinctiveness is referred to as “secondary meaning”; and
secondary meaning is a mental association in consumers’ minds between the asserted trademark
and a single source of the product).
30. See id.
31. Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion”
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
175, 180 (2004).
32. Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 191–92 (1995)
(“Arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive marks are afforded the highest level of protection, whereas
generic names are not considered ‘marks’ and are therefore unprotectable.”).
33. See Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits,
84 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 1–2 (1994) (“To succeed on a trademark infringement claim under the
Lanham Act, plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods at issue. .
. . Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that
the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service
identified by a similar mark.”).
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III. AY, THERE’S THE RUB: CONSUMER CONFUSION
Whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source
of the goods at issue is the seminal question in trademark infringement
cases. There are two types of consumer confusion: forward and reverse.34
A. Forward Confusion
“Forward or direct confusion results when a consumer mistakenly
believes that the junior user’s products are produced by or associated with
the senior user.”35 The typical test for forward confusion is the Polaroid
test.36 The Polaroid factors are: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s
trademark; (2) the similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks;
(3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the senior owner
will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the sophistication
of the buyers; (7) the defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; and (8)
the quality of the defendant’s product.37 The circuit courts of appeal,
however, have each taken the test and altered it to their own accord; thus,
each circuit’s factors are slightly different.38 “[T]he ultimate question
remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products
or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.”39

34. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 287 (2003).
35. Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
737, 737 (2004).
36. Although each circuit has its own variance of the Polaroid factors, this Note will use
the Polaroid factors (referring to the first factors set forth for likelihood of confusion) for the sake
of consistency.
37. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
38. See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion”
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
175, 181 (“While Polaroid is considered the landmark decision on this issue for its enunciation of
an eight-factor likelihood of confusion test, even the Polaroid court posited that other factors may
be taken into account to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion in a forward
confusion case. As a result, various circuit courts have created their own tests, which while
sometimes featuring fewer or more factors than those specified in Polaroid, remain fairly uniform
in purpose.”).
39. 88 ELEANOR L. GROSSMAN, OHIO JUR. § 148 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Future Lawn, Inc.
v. Maumee Bay Landscape Contractors, L.L.C., 542 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (N.D. Ohio 2008)).
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1. Analyzing the Forward Confusion Factors
The Second Circuit nicely detailed how to analyze the Polaroid
factors of a typical confusion case in Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime
Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1996). As to the first factor—the
strength of the mark—the Sports Authority court stated that the strength of
a plaintiff’s mark is decided by its inherent distinctiveness as determined
using the Abercrombie scale,40 as well as by its commercial distinctiveness
of the plaintiff’s mark in the marketplace.41 A registered mark is
“presumed to be distinctive and should be afforded the utmost
protection.”42 However, acquired distinctiveness is also important.43
Because the strength of a trademark for the purposes of likelihood of
confusion depends on “the interplay between conceptual and commercial
strength,” inherent distinctiveness cannot be the only inquiry.44 The longer
a mark has been prominently used in commerce, the greater the likelihood
that consumers will recognize it as indicating the origin of a good.45
Consumer confusion results when a mark that has been long used to
designate the source of one origin is used on another.46 Typically, evidence
of the commercial strength of a mark includes how long the mark has been
used, the type and amount of advertising used to promote the mark, the
prominence of the mark in advertising, the volume of sales, the area where

40. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (creating the four classes of trademarks: generic,
descriptive, arbitrary and fanciful); accord. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (upholding the
Abercrombie classification, but splitting the fourth category of ‘arbitrary and fanciful’ into
categories four and five, ‘arbitrary’ and ‘fanciful’).
41. See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating that a mark’s “independent indicia of strength” is relevant to deciding whether the
strength of the mark weighs in favor or against finding a likelihood of confusion under Polaroid);
Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 182 (describing how the court in Sports Authority examined the
Polaroid factor of the strength of the mark).
42. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
43. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003).
44. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir.
2012).
45. Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 148.
46. Id.
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the sales occur, “unsolicited media recognition of the mark, and dictionary
listings of the word as a brand name.”47
As to the second Polaroid factor—the similarity of the marks—courts
examine the look, sound, and meaning of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
marks, as well as how the marks are used.48 The marks must be compared
in their entirety.49 If both marks are identical, then the manner in which the
parties use the marks is of greatest significance to this factor.50 In deciding
whether the marks are similarly used, courts look at how the marks are
presented in the marketplace.51 Side-by-side comparisons are not used to
distinguish the marks; rather, marks are compared in terms of the “overall
commercial impression” that confusion as to the source of the goods or
services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.52
As to the third Polaroid factor—the proximity of the products—the
Sports Authority court explained that this factor inspects the relationship
between the channels through which the plaintiff and defendant buy or sell
their product.53 Courts consider whether the products compete directly and
whether they share the same marketing channel.54 Consumers are less
likely to be confused when two users of a similar mark operate in wholly
different markets, because there is no assumption that “their similarly
branded products come from the same source.”55 For example, no
consumer would reasonably assume that Ferrari brand cars are associated
47. 111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 15 (2009).
48. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 463.
49. POLLACK, supra note 47, § 16.
50. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 23:59, 23:60 (4th ed. 2015).
51. Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 962.
52. MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:59 & n.1 (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the trial court inappropriately
focused on the similarity of the marks in a side-by-side comparison instead of viewing them in
the overall context of the marketplace).
53. Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963.
54. Id.
55. Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 150.
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with Ferrari brand apples because those two products are completely
unrelated. However, when the two users’ marks operate in close areas of
commerce, the consumer is more likely to mistake the second user’s goods
as coming from the first user.56 For example, it would be reasonable for a
consumer to be confused in believing that Ferrari brand cars are associated
with Ferrari brand motorcycles because those products are at least
somewhat related.
As to the fourth Polaroid factor—the likelihood that the senior user
will bridge the gap—courts look at the likelihood that the plaintiff will
enter defendant’s primary business area.57 In determining this likelihood,
the court can further examine how likely “the average customer would
perceive” the plaintiff would enter the defendant’s business.58 The more
likely a plaintiff is to enter into the defendant’s business area using its
mark, the more likely consumers are to be confused as to the source of the
mark’s goods.59 The absence of an intent to bridge the gap, however, does
not negate a finding of a likelihood of confusion.60
As to the fifth Polaroid factor—evidence of actual consumer
confusion—the Sports Authority court explored whether the defendant’s
use of the mark may cause the plaintiff commercial injury.61 In addition to
evidence of loss of sales, commercial injury is also determined by whether
the defendant’s use of the mark will “confuse[] the public into believing
that the plaintiff actually sponsors [the] defendant’s products.”62 “Actual
confusion is normally proven through the use of direct evidence, i.e.,
testimony from members of the buying public, as well as through
circumstantial evidence, e.g., consumer surveys or consumer reaction
tests.”63 Misdirected phone calls and results of consumer surveys are
56. Id.
57. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 183 (describing how the court in Sports Authority
examined the Polaroid factor of bridging the gap).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
61. See Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963.
62. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 183–84 (describing how the court in Sports Authority
examined the Polaroid factor of actual confusion).
63. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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evidence that the plaintiff lost control over how the public perceives its
product.64 However, in First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Council
Bluffs v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Lincoln, the circuit court
explained that while surveys are direct and persuasive evidence of
customer confusion, the court has never held that “such a survey is an
essential ingredient of a successful service-mark or trademark claim.”65 In
fact, it is “black letter law” that to prevail on a trademark infringement
claim, actual confusion need not be shown.66
As to the sixth Polaroid factor—the sophistication of the buyers—the
less sophisticated the buyers are of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s products,
the more confusion is likely to exist.67 However, “while price differences
are important in determining the sophistication of customers, they are not
dispositive.”68 The general impression of the ordinary purchaser under
normal purchasing conditions is assessed to examine the level of consumer
sophistication in purchasing choices.69 An ordinary purchaser, particularly
one that buys inexpensive items on impulse, is most likely to be confused
by similar marks.70
As to the seventh Polaroid factor—the defendant’s good faith in
adopting its mark—the issue is whether the defendant chose its mark with
the intention of capitalizing on the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation.71
This may include the defendant’s adoption of a mark similar to plaintiff’s
mark with the intent to confuse consumers, thus benefiting from the

64. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority
examined the Polaroid factor of actual confusion).
65. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Council Bluffs v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Lincoln, 929 F.2d 382, 384–85 (8th Cir. 1991).
66. Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 457 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
67. See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:95.
68. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 1995).
69. Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 965.
70. See Rich Stim, Likelihood of Confusion: How Do You Determine If a Trademark is
Infringing?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/likelihood-confusion-how-do-youdetermine-trademark-infringing.html [http://perma.cc/TQE4-5CUU].
71. Best Cellars, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
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plaintiff’s goodwill.72
Other considerations include whether the
defendant’s mark is reflective of its product, whether the defendant
conducted a trademark search prior to adoption of the mark, and whether
defendant relied on legal advice in choosing its mark.73 Intentional copying
gives rise to a presumption of bad faith.74 Further, constructive knowledge
may signal bad faith.75 Many courts have stated that the junior user has a
“duty” to name and dress his good or service as to avoid consumer
confusion with the senior user’s product.76
As to the eighth and final Polaroid factor—the quality of defendant’s
product—the court looks at whether the junior user’s product is of inferior
quality as compared to the plaintiff’s product.77 This factor is primarily
concerned with whether the senior user’s reputation could be jeopardized
by virtue of the fact that the junior user’s product is of inferior quality.78 A
plaintiff must provide evidence that the defendant’s products are in fact
inferior as compared to plaintiff’s product.79
2. Applying the Forward Confusion Factors
“While no one factor of the Polaroid test is dispositive to any one
forward confusion case, a plaintiff that successfully argues more factors in
its favor will prove a likelihood of confusion and ultimately win the
case.”80 Although courts use different tests, the tests are mainly

72. See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:124.
73. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority
examined the Polaroid factor of good faith).
74. See Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 259.
76. Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir.
1960).
77. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority
examined the Polaroid factor of quality of defendant’s products).
78. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.
1986).
79. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184.
80. Id. at 185.
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harmonious.81 One might imagine that if each circuit greatly differed in its
test, there would be more forum shopping to find a favorable result, but
there is no evidence of this.
Courts face a problem when they apply the consumer confusion
factors designed for forward confusion cases to reverse confusion cases.82
Forward confusion involves two “equal litigants,” and as such, the
Polaroid factors are adequate to deal with this scenario.83 In contrast,
“because the reverse confusion doctrine involves a smaller, weaker senior
user, the Polaroid factors, on their face, are not an adequate test for these
cases.”84
B. Reverse Confusion
Reverse confusion occurs “when a consumer mistakenly believes that
both products are manufactured by or associated with the junior user.”85
This problem arises when a larger, more powerful user adopts a trademark
of a smaller, less powerful user, and therefore causes confusion as to the
origin of the senior trademark user’s goods or services.86 The harm from
reverse confusion is the same as forward confusion to the extent that both
involve “attempts to misappropriate another’s talents.”87 Further, reverse
confusion imposes the additional harm of depriving the senior user “the
advertising value of its name” on the wrongly identified good, as well as
the goodwill that would ordinarily come from the public’s knowledge of

81. See Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringment Claims to Achieve More
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2014).
82. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 186 (“Specifically, there is no one test that exists
uniformly throughout the nation’s courts with which to properly analyze a ‘reverse confusion’
claim.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Scholer, supra note 35, at 737.
86. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL.,
AND MATERIALS 430 (5th ed. 2013).

TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES

87. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of Doctrine of “Reverse Passing Off”
Under Lanham Act, 194 A.L.R. FED. 175, 187–88 (2004).
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the true identity of the desired good.88 Moreover, the ultimate purchaser of
the product is harmed by the loss of knowledge as to, and possible
deception regarding, the true source of the good.89
The phenomenon of reverse confusion originally caused difficulties
for the courts, which did not recognize reverse confusion as an actionable
claim until the later half of the twentieth century.90 Although the concept
of reverse confusion was first alluded to as early as 1918, it was not
judicially accepted until nearly sixty years later in 1977.91 In 1968, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed, but ultimately rejected,
reverse confusion as a doctrine in Westward Coach Manufacturing Co. v.
Ford Motor Co..92 There, Westward Coach Manufacturing Company
(“Westward”) marketed its campers and trailers under breeds of horses,
such as “Pinto” and “Mustang.”93 Westward first used the name
“Mustang” in 1960, and by 1967 the mark was federally registered. When
Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), the leading car company in the nation at
the time, came out with its “Mustang” sports car in 1962, Ford refused to
rename it after learning of Westward’s mark.94 Ford subsequently ran large
advertisements that referred to its trucks as “Camper Specials,” adding to
the confusion.95 Although the facts plainly reflect a case of reverse

88. Id. at 188.
89. Id.
90. See Mott, supra note 81, at 442.
91. Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 186 (1995); Int’l
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring) (asserting
that, in the ordinary case, the defendant is passing off their product as the plaintiff’s, but the same
harm can occur vice versa, from the plaintiff falsely passing off its product as the defendant’s).
92. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1968)
(holding that reverse confusion is not an actionable claim); see also Mott, supra note 81, at 442
n.97; Brent Folsom, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 258, 259 (2001) (“Although these facts suggest a textbook reverse confusion case, the
Seventh Circuit rejected Westward’s reverse confusion claim as possessing ‘no rational basis for
support.’”).
93. Westward Coach Mfg., 388 F.2d at 630.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 630–31.
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confusion, the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim, holding that because
Westward’s mark was weak and only for trailers and campers, Westward
had no claim against Ford for using the mark on a different good.96 In
ruling so, the court completely missed the “mark” on reverse confusion.
The smaller size of Westward’s campaign, though dwarfed by Ford’s, did
not dispel the fact that Westward had a federally registered, protectable
mark. Accordingly, the court should have continued to analyze whether
there was a likelihood of consumer confusion.
In the 1977 landmark case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized reverse
confusion as a doctrine and established the legal principle that a subsequent
user of a mark (typically a larger user) could be held liable for infringement
to an original user (typically a smaller user).97 The Big O Tire court,
however, did not establish a test for analyzing reverse confusion claims. 98
Since the Big O Tire decision, all circuit courts have recognized and
adopted the doctrine of reverse confusion.99
1. Why Reverse Confusion Was Not Originally Recognized
At first, courts did not readily recognize reverse confusion because
the doctrine is counterintuitive to the idea that the junior user, acting as the
typically weaker user, would want to target the goodwill created by the
stronger senior user’s mark.100 In reverse confusion cases, however, the
strength of the users is flipped. Because the junior user is the wealthier and
more powerful user in such a case, the junior user has no desire to
capitalize on the senior user’s less established goodwill.101 This fact hurt
96. Id. at 635.
97. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1977) (holding that reverse confusion is actionable); see also Mott, supra note 81, at 442
(discussing the Big O Tire opinion); Folsom, supra note 92, at 259 (“The modern track for
reverse confusion doctrine was laid by the landmark case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.”).
98. Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d at 1371–72; Mott, supra note 81, at 442 (explaining that
the Big O Tire court did not create a framework for reverse confusion cases other than the typical
forward confusion framework).
99. Mott, supra note 81, at 442.
100. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir.
1992).
101. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480 (3d Cir. 1994)
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the senior user’s claim; without the intent to trade on the senior user’s
goodwill, courts were not willing to recognize a junior user’s bad intent in
adopting the mark.102 Furthermore, by virtue of the senior user being the
lesser-known user, the commercial strength of its mark would be deemed
weaker than the junior user’s.103 Consequently, in analyzing the strength of
the mark, the senior user would lose.104
The confusion that the senior user’s mark is affiliated with the wellrecognized junior user also makes it less likely that the senior user suffered
harm by a loss in sales (indeed, sales may have increased because of the
mistaken affiliation).105 Nevertheless, reverse confusion still harms the
senior user by diminishing the value of the senior user’s trademark, diluting
the senior user’s product identity and corporate identity, stripping much of
the senior user’s control over its goodwill or reputation, and negatively
affecting the senior user’s ability to move into new markets.106 Once courts
started recognizing that a weaker senior user was in fact harmed by a junior
user’s adoption of its mark, reverse confusion became actionable.107
One of the problems in developing a coherent reverse confusion
analysis is that the Polaroid court listed the forward confusion factors, but
never defined them (even in the forward confusion analysis).108 Hence, the

(“[T]he junior user [in a reverse confusion case] does not seek to trade on the good will and name
of the senior user; instead he overwhelms it.”).
102. See id. at 479–80 (concluding the relevant inquiry in reverse confusion is not the
junior user’s intent to appropriate the senior user’s goodwill, but rather the junior user’s
carelessness toward confusion in adopting the mark).
103. See, e.g., id. at 479.
104. Id. (“[I]n a case of reverse confusion, the evidence of commercial strength is
different from what we expect in a case of forward confusion, where the junior user tries to palm
off his goods as those of the senior user. . . . In reverse confusion, the junior user is typically a
wealthier, more powerful company who can overwhelm the market with advertising. An
aggressive junior user may thereby achieve greater commercial strength in a short period of time
than the senior user has after years of marketing its product.”).
105. Joel R. Feldman, Note, Reverse Confusion in Trademarks: Balancing the Interests of
the Public, the Trademark Owner, and the Infringer, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 163, 169 (2003).
106. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 957–58.
107. Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 474–75.
108. Cusson, supra note 91, at 196.
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means for applying the factors have “subsequently been developed and
defined throughout case law in each of the circuits, thereby producing
inconsistent results.”109 Another problem arises when courts use the
forward confusion factors for reverse confusion claims since, as this Note
discussed, the two situations confront distinct issues.110 “While some
circuit courts analyzing instances of reverse confusion apply a similar
framework to that used in forward-confusion cases, only recently have all
circuits recognized the reverse-confusion phenomenon, and some have no
framework in place whatsoever to analyze these cases.”111
2. Reverse Confusion Factors as Applied
As previously noted, each circuit court has its own analysis of factors
for reverse confusion.112 For example, in 1995, the Second Circuit
determined that, for purposes of reverse confusion, it is the junior user’s
commercial strength and the junior user’s bad faith efforts in investigating
previous use of the mark and/or knowledge of such use that is particularly
important.113 Then, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that reverse confusion
was actionable under the Lanham Act in Banff, Ltd. v. Federated
Department Stores, Inc..114 Establishing reverse confusion as an actionable
doctrine is a significant development because the power imbalance between
the senior and junior users is addressed to reach a just result.
In 1994, the Third Circuit in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro
Industry, Inc. stated, “Although we have not yet adopted the doctrine of

109. Id.
110. Id. at 197 (applying forward confusion factors to reverse confusion situations
“overlook[s] that the two are distinct from one another and, as such, should not be identically
analyzed”).
111. Mott, supra note 81, at 442.
112. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 186–202.
113. Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 684
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[I]n a reverse confusion case, exactly which trademark is the relevant one to
examine when considering the strength of the mark? The court holds that it is logical to examine
the strength of the junior user’s mark.”).
114. Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e
hold that reverse confusion—perhaps the primary type of confusion involved in this case—is
actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”).
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reverse confusion in a trademark case, we do so here.”115 The court went
on to use its forward confusion test116 with three exceptions applicable to
reverse confusion cases.117 The exceptions analyze both the strength of the
mark and the junior user’s good faith.118 First, in reverse confusion, the
commercial strength of the senior user’s mark is not as important as it is in
forward confusion.119 Rather, it is the commercial strength of the junior
user’s mark that is of importance.120 Second, the court found that because
the junior user’s mark is usually commercially stronger than the senior
user’s mark, the inherent strength (i.e., distinctiveness) of the senior user’s
mark should be given more consideration than its commercial strength.121
Finally, the court concluded that because the junior user is not trying to
benefit from the senior user’s goodwill, the good faith intent factor in
reverse confusion should be analyzed as whether the junior user was
“careless” in its search of previous users of a similar trademark and
whether the junior user followed through with its investigation if it found
there were such companies.122 Despite these promising exceptions set forth
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, at least two district courts (within the
circuit) that subsequently heard reverse confusion cases have disregarded
the precedent.123
115. Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 475.
116. POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Third Circuit uses the 10 Lapp factors.”) (citing
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.3d 460 (3d Cir. 1983)).
117. See Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 475–81.
118. Id. at 478–80.
119. Id. at 478–79.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 479 (“The district court, in treating this case like one of forward confusion,
put great emphasis on the lack of commercial strength of Fisons’ mark and virtually none on its
distinctiveness. In reverse confusion, the mark of the senior user is typically weaker
commercially than that of the junior user. On remand, the strength of Fisons’ mark will have to
be reevaluated in light of our adoption of reverse confusion and its distinctiveness as well as its
commercial strength will have to be considered.”).
122. Id. at 480 (concluding that the appropriate intent inquiry here is more akin to the one
identified in Lapp: “while it may have acted innocently, was [the junior user] careless in not
conducting a thorough name search for American uses of the name”? (citing Lapp, 721 F.2d at
463)).
123. Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 188 & n.69 (collecting district court cases within the
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The Seventh Circuit recognized reverse confusion as a redressable
injury in 1992 in Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co..124 There,
the court took its forward confusion seven-factor likelihood of confusion
test125 and developed two tweaks to be used in reverse confusion cases.126
First, similar to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit stated that it is the
commercial strength of the junior user’s mark that is important rather than
the commercial strength of the senior user’s mark.127 Second, the court
postulated that when determining the “bad faith” factor, the question to be
asked is whether the junior user knew of the senior user’s use of the mark,
but proceeded to use it anyway as a showing of bad faith.128
In 1994, the Eighth Circuit held that the Lanham Act’s likelihood of
confusion language was broad enough to encompass reverse confusion.129
However, the court did not give guidance regarding the reverse confusion
analysis.130 In the 1997 case Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v NBA
Properties, Inc., the district court, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s
recognition of reverse confusion, took its six-factor forward confusion

Third Circuit disregarding the Fisons Horticulture analysis).
124. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 958.
125. POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Seventh Circuit lists seven factors: (1) the
similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of concurrent
use; (4) the degree of care likely to be used by consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark;
(6) whether any actual confusion exists; and (7) the defendant’s intent to palm off its goods as
those of the plaintiff.”) (citing Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir
2002)).
126. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 959–61.
127. Id. at 959 (“In a reverse confusion case, then, it may make more sense to consider
the strength of the mark in terms of its association with the junior user’s goods.”); see also
Buckman, supra note 34, at 292.
128. See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 961 (“In a reverse confusion case, of course,
the defendant by definition is not palming off or otherwise attempting to create confusion as to
the source of his product. Thus, the ‘intent’ factor of the likelihood of confusion analysis is
essentially irrelevant in a reverse confusion case. As the district court noted, however, ‘[a]
finding of fraudulent intent or bad faith is not essential to prove infringement where likelihood of
confusion already exists.’”).
129. Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir.
1994).
130. Id.
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test131 and altered it for reverse confusion cases.132 Much like the Third and
Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit held that the junior user’s commercial
strength is relevant to the analysis, over the senior user’s commercial
strength, and that the junior user’s bad faith should be examined to
determine if the junior user searched for or knew of the senior user’s mark
prior to adoption.133 The Eighth Circuit further observed that the
relatedness of the products is not as significant a factor in a reverse
confusion case because the consumers might associate the smaller plaintiff
senior user’s mark with the larger defendant user’s mark, even on unrelated
products.134
Even with developing recognition of reverse confusion, there are
circuits that do not have a workable framework for these cases, resulting in
judicial inconsistencies.135 For instance, in 1987 the Sixth Circuit
recognized reverse confusion in Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information
Technologies Corp., stating that Ohio had a long history of protecting
trademark owners from forward confusion and the same policy interests are
involved in reverse confusion.136 The appellate court explained, “The
senior user’s interests in the trademark can be suffocated by the junior user
who takes the trademark as his own; and consumers can be confused that
the senior user’s products come from the junior user or that the senior has

131. POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Eighth Circuit lists six factors: (1) the strength
of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the
degree to which the allegedly infringing product competes with the plaintiff’s goods; (4) the
alleged infringer’s intent to confuse the public; (5) the degree of care reasonably expected of
potential customers; and (6) evidence of actual confusion.” (citing SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628
F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980))).
132. Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1411 (E.D.
Mo. 1997) (“The test for infringement remains likelihood of confusion. Nevertheless, the Court’s
analysis of the . . . factors must be modified, as necessary, in a case of reverse confusion.”).
133. Id. at 1412, 1415 (“In a reverse confusion case, analysis of a mark’s distinctiveness
in the marketplace—its commercial strength—is of considerably less significance than in a
forward confusion case.”).
134. Id. at 1414 (“Although the Court must analyze the degree to which goods compete in
evaluating the likelihood of confusion, the significance of this factor may decrease in a case of
reverse confusion.”).
135. See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1987);
Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d 1365.
136. Ameritech, 811 F.2d at 966.
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become associated with the junior.”137 Yet, despite recognizing the distinct
issue of a stronger secondary user, the Sixth Circuit later used the same
analysis for forward and reverse confusion, causing inconsistent and unjust
results.138
In another example, as noted above, in 1977 the Tenth Circuit held
that reverse confusion was actionable in Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Corp., but did not set forth unique analyses or
exceptions to their forward confusion test for likelihood of confusion.139
As each circuit applies a different analysis to reverse confusion,
litigation results differ depending on the forum.140 The Supreme Court has
not yet taken a case on certiorari, and thus is yet to set a definitive test for
reverse confusion.141
Unfortunately, because not all circuits have
developed a consistent approach,142 weaker senior users do not always get
the protection they deserve.
IV. WHY REVERSE CONFUSION PROTECTION IS IMPORTANT
A clear and coherent test to analyze reverse confusion is necessary in
order to protect senior users that are smaller, less powerful entities in
comparison to the junior users.143 Under reverse confusion, because the
junior user is using the same or similar trademark as the senior user, the
public might incorrectly perceive that the senior user is trading off the
goodwill of the junior user when it is the senior user who was the first to
use the mark.144 “The result is that the senior user loses the value of the

137. Id.
138. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying
the forward confusion factors analysis to a case of reverse confusion).
139. See generally Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d 1365.
140. See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 958 n.12.
141. See id.
142. See Mott, supra note 81, at 443–44.
143. See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse
Confusion” Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 175, 186 (2004).
144. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992).
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trademark—its product identity, corporate identity, control over its
goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new markets.”145
If more powerful junior users can use and appropriate whichever
marks they want, then the trademark protection afforded to the trademark
holder’s goodwill would be worthless to smaller users.146 Furthermore, if
reverse confusion is not properly addressed, there would be no incentive
for junior users to pay senior users for the right to use their trademark—it is
cheaper to infringe when the senior user has no actionable basis.147 If the
law were limited to situations of traditional trademark infringement, i.e.,
forward confusion, anyone with adequate size and resources could adopt
any mark and develop a new meaning for it as identification of its own
products.148
Without redressability for reverse confusion, not only are weaker
senior users harmed, but consumers are as well.149 If the junior user’s
goods are of inferior quality to that of the senior user, then confused
consumers will associate the inferiority with the senior user’s mark and
may never have the confusion dispelled.150 The confusion then hurts the
senior user further by turning the senior user’s mark “from an asset of
goodwill into a liability of ill will” when the consumers believe that the
senior user is passing off the junior user’s goods as its own.151
Reverse confusion results in precisely the type of harm to trademark

145. Id.
146. 111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS, § 7 (2009) (“[R]everse confusion protects
smaller senior users . . . against larger, more powerful companies who want to use identical or
confusingly similar trademarks. . . . Absent reverse confusion, a company with a well established
trade name and with the economic power to advertise extensively would be immunized from suit
for a product name taken from a competitor.”).
147. See id. (“[W]ithout the existence of such a [reverse confusion] claim, smaller
business owners might not have any incentive to invest in their marks at all, for fear the mark
could be usurped at will by a larger competitor.”).
148. Deborah F. Buckman, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham Trademark Act,
187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 288 (2003).
149. Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
737, 738 (2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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owners and consumers that the Lanham Act sought to protect.152 This
includes the protection from deception as to the source of goods, reaping
where one has not sown, and tarnishing the goodwill and reputation of the
senior user.153 “By failing to recognize reverse confusion or refusing to
modify existing forward-confusion analyses, courts not only deprive many
small businesses . . . from a cause of action to defend their marks against
larger users, but also hinder consumers from making informed decisions in
choosing products.”154
As there is no consistent and clear test applied by the courts, the best
way to dispel confusion regarding reverse confusion is through legislative
action to amend the Lanham Act. Amending the Act would solve two
problems. First, reverse confusion would be statutorily recognized as a
separate cause of action (distinct from traditional forward confusion), and
second, the factors for analyzing a reverse confusion claim would be fixed
and defined (thereby establishing uniformity).155 Affording reverse
confusion claims their own uniform test benefits all: parties would be better
able to gage their cases and prepare for court, forum shopping would be
deterred, and confusion among the consuming public would be reduced.156
Perhaps most importantly, “a smaller company that invests its time, energy,
and finances into product development, trademark procurement, and
product launch will have a viable cause of action should a larger, more

152. See 15 U.S.C § 1125 (2012); S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
153. Scholer, supra note 149, at 742 (“Trademark protection assures that consumers
receive an item from the intended originator, and that trademark owners retain the value of the
resources they commit to building their mark and associated goodwill without others
misappropriating their mark.”).
154. Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 450 (2014).
155. See Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 233 (1995)
(arguing for “courts to recognize reverse confusion as its own unique legal paradigm, distinct
from direct confusion, and to formulate a test specific for the reverse confusion situation”). This
Note asserts going beyond judicial recognition, to legislative action.
156. Mott, supra note 154, at 450 (“Creating and implementing a more uniform reverseconfusion framework will not only improve judicial economy in trademark law, but will also
reduce forum shopping and improve consumer confidence in our economic and legal systems.”).
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powerful company poach on its mark.”157
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Reverse Confusion Factors as They Should be Analyzed
For purposes of reverse confusion, once it is established that the
senior user is a mark holder with a protectable mark, an analysis of the
likelihood of consumer confusion should follow. The likelihood of
consumer confusion should be analyzed using the existing Polaroid factors,
however some factors should be modified to deal with reverse confusion
where the senior user is weaker and the stronger junior user is not trying to
capitalize off of the senior user’s goodwill.158 Amending the Lanham Act
is necessary where, as here, the circuits apply different factors for both
traditional forward confusion and reverse confusion. Unless amended by
legislation, judicial attempts to adopt a uniform reverse confusion test will
not be successful, as the courts already do not agree on a test for the more
common forward confusion cases.159
A reverse confusion analysis using the eight Polaroid factors to
determine the likelihood of consumer confusion is proposed as follows.
For factor one, strength of the mark, the courts should focus on the
commercial strength of the junior user’s mark and not the commercial
strength of the senior user’s mark.160 Focusing the factor in this way is
more practical in reverse confusion; because the junior user is the stronger
party, a senior user would therefore almost always lose on this factor.161
157. Del Pizzo, supra note 143, at 207.
158. Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 233–34 (1995)
(“The best method for analyzing reverse confusion is to borrow the factors from the direct
confusion Polaroid likelihood of confusion test and modify them to fit into the reverse confusion
context.”).
159. See id. at 234 (observing circuit inconsistencies regarding the Polaroid factors even
in direct confusion cases).
160. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“In a reverse confusion case, then, it may make more sense to consider the strength of the mark
in terms of its association with the junior user’s goods.”); see Cusson, supra note 158, at 238.
161. Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion”
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
175, 205 (2004).
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Focusing on the junior user’s commercial strength instead can better bring
to light the senior user’s injury.162 Finally, a finding of a strong junior
mark leans towards the showing of likelihood of confusion.163 However,
the court should still look at the senior user’s inherent strength of the mark,
as done in the usual forward confusion analysis that uses the Abercrombie
factors.164
Factor two, the similarity of the marks, should be analyzed in much
the same fashion as the forward confusion analysis. However, this factor
should not be given too much importance.165 As the Eighth Circuit posited,
consumers may associate the senior user’s mark with the junior user’s mark
even if the products are completely different.166
Factor three, proximity of the mark, should be analyzed under the
same forward confusion analysis: observe the channels through which the
parties buy and sell their goods and analyze “whether the products compete
directly and share the same channel.”167
Factor four, bridging the gap, should also be analyzed like forward
confusion.168 If a plaintiff is unable to show that it will enter the
defendant’s market, however, this should not be the final nail in the
coffin.169 As the senior user in reverse confusion cases is the weaker user,
it is likely that it is not able to or do not plan to expand.170 This is precisely
162. Id.
163. See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 959.
164. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205.
165. Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 449 (2014).
166. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205.
167. Id.; see also Mott, supra note 165, at 449.
168. See Cusson, supra note 158, at 235 (asserting no dramatic altering to reverse
confusion is necessary because the bridging the gap factor “has been fairly consistently applied”).
169. See Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205–06; Cusson, supra note 158, at 235 (advising
to analyze Bridging the Gap “in conjunction with Proximity of the Products, taking into account
not only the stated intentions of the senior user to expand, but also the probability that the two
products are so closely related that the consumers will perceive them as emanating from the same
source, thereby conceptually bridging the gap in their own minds”).
170. Cusson, supra note 158, at 235.
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why the factors for reverse confusion should be analyzed differently than
forward confusion.
Factor five, actual confusion, should be reviewed just as it is in
forward confusion.171 The relevant inquiry in reverse confusion, however,
is not whether the public believes the defendant’s goods are affiliated with
the plaintiff, but whether the public believes that the plaintiff’s goods are
affiliated with the defendant.172 Again, this is because in reverse confusion,
the plaintiff is the weaker user by definition and therefore has less
recognition, while the defendant is the stronger user and floods the market.
Accordingly, consumers are more aware of the defendant’s goods than the
plaintiff’s goods.173
Factor six, good faith, should not be analyzed under the normal intent
analysis of forward confusion.174 A widely-recognized and stronger junior
user would not want to trade off of the senior user’s weaker goodwill.175
Therefore, the relevant inquiries here should be whether the defendant
conducted a search to see if the trademark was already in use, whether it
relied on legal counsel in adopting the mark, and whether it continued to
adopt the mark despite knowing that the senior user was already using it.176
Factor seven, quality of the goods, should also be analyzed like
forward confusion, inquiring whether defendant’s product is inferior
quality and therefore tarnishing the plaintiff’s reputation.177
Factor eight, the sophistication of the parties’ consumers, should be
analyzed similarly to forward confusion.178 The less sophisticated the
senior user’s consumer, the greater chance there is a likelihood of
171. Id. at 239; see also Mott, supra note 165, at 449 (“Actual confusion is arguably the
best indicator of likelihood of confusion . . . .”).
172. Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1415 (E.D.
Mo. 1997) (“To establish actual confusion in a reverse confusion case, the Second Circuit has
held that the only relevant confusion is a belief by the senior user’s purchasers or prospective
purchasers that the senior user’s product was produced by or affiliated with the junior user.”).
173. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206.
174. See Cusson, supra note 158, at 236–37.
175. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206; see also Cusson, supra note 158, at 237.
176. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480 (3d Cir. 1994).
177. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206–07.
178. Cusson, supra note 158, at 234.
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confusion.179
Finally, it must be highlighted that just as in forward confusion, none
of these factors alone should be dispositive.180 Yet a plaintiff who is able
to prove a majority of these factors should be able to evince the likelihood
of reverse consumer confusion and ultimately prevail.181
B. The Proposed Legislative Amendment
The best solution to accomplishing a clear and consistent reverse
confusion analysis is to have reverse confusion in the Lanham Act.
Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act (under “likely to cause confusion”)
should be amended to additionally apply to situations where a weaker
senior user finds that its goods or services are being confused with that of a
stronger junior user. Moreover, the Act should set forth the factors
applicable to each type of confusion. In reverse confusion cases, courts
should adjust their analysis as posited in this Note. Further statutorily
defining the relevant considerations under each factor would be
phenomenal, but is not essential because further inquiry, if any, would be
specific to the facts before the court.
Legislative action in amending the Lanham Act is the best way to
dispel the confusion regarding reverse confusion because it would settle
two separate but important issues. It is imperative to establish reverse
confusion as a separate actionable claim and under such a claim, to define
the factors in analyzing consumer confusion.182 In this manner, the courts
can follow a coherent uniform test, producing consistent and more
predictable results.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reverse confusion was first alluded to in 1918183 and was officially

179. Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 207.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Cusson, supra note 158, at 233.
183. Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 186 (1995); Int’l
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring).
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recognized by a federal court in 1977.184 Despite all circuit courts
recognizing the doctrine of reverse confusion in the decades following,
there is still no uniform test or application of factors set forth to deal with
such a claim.185 Therefore, the Lanham Act should be amended as
proposed in this Note in order to clearly indicate that under the “likelihood
of confusion” statute there are two separate actionable bases: forward
confusion and reverse confusion. Further, the Act must articulate and
define the factors to be considered under each claim. Legislative action in
this way would dispel the confusion regarding reverse confusion—whether
in the judiciary, the trademark office, or in business practices.

184. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1977) (holding that reverse confusion is actionable); see also Christina P. Mott, Note,
Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of Confusion” Factors for ReverseConfusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More Consistent and Predictable Results,
47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 442 (2014) (discussing the Big O Tire opinion); Brent Folsom,
Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 258, 259 (2001)
(“The modern track for reverse confusion doctrine was laid by the landmark case Big O Tire
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co..”).
185. See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse
Confusion” Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 175, 186–202 (2004) (discussing several circuit courts’ analyses and the
different factors that each circuit uses in analyzing a reverse confusion case, thus causing
confusion due to the lack of a uniform test); see also Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong
in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 737, 739 (2004) (“In direct and reverse confusion cases,
courts use varied multifactor tests to determine whether a ‘likelihood of confusion’ exists between
the senior and junior users’ marks.”).

